reactotron-react-native
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established package with 400k+ weekly downloads; README/keyword signals are false positives here. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Raw IP appears only in a unit test for URL parsing logic, not in runtime code. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.0 | 3 / 30 | |
| 5.1.17 | 2 / 30 | |
| 5.1.16 | 2 / 35 | |
| 5.1.9 | 2 / 36 | |
| 5.1.8 | 2 / 36 |
v5.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.