runed
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Project uses GitHub Actions for publishing with SLSA provenance; 'huntabyte → GitHub Actions' is an expected CI migration, not a takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently publishes with SLSA provenance via GitHub Actions CI/CD. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.37.1 | 3 / 24 | |
| 0.37.0 | 3 / 24 | |
| 0.36.0 | 3 / 24 | |
| 0.35.1 | 3 / 23 | |
| 0.35.0 | 3 / 23 | |
| 0.34.0 | 3 / 23 | |
| 0.33.0 | 3 / 23 | |
| 0.32.0 | 3 / 23 | |
| 0.31.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.31.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.30.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.29.2 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.29.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.29.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.28.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.27.0 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.26.0 | 1 / 20 |
v0.37.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.37.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.36.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.35.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.35.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.34.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.33.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.32.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.31.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.31.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.30.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.29.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.29.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.29.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.28.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.27.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.26.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.