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sanity-plugin-utils

npm Repository Homepage
19
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

bjoergesanity-svc.npmsanity-io

Keywords

sanitysanity-plugin

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Moved to sanity-svc.npm service account for org-level CI publishing; legitimate transition. ai
provenance missing-githead AI (provenance): Monorepo CI publish via pkg-utils; SLSA provenance present instead. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): Added official Sanity org accounts (sanity-io, sanity-svc.npm, bjoerge). ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): Major version bump after monorepo migration explains dormancy. ai
source-diff source-size-dropped AI (source-diff): v2 rewrite with simplified API; ships only dist/ from monorepo build. ai

Versions (showing 19 of 19)

Version Deps Published
2.0.13 6 / 10
2.0.12 6 / 10
2.0.11 6 / 10
2.0.10 6 / 10
2.0.8 6 / 10
2.0.7 6 / 10
2.0.6 6 / 10
2.0.5 6 / 11
2.0.4 6 / 11
2.0.3 6 / 11
2.0.2 5 / 12
2.0.1 5 / 12
2.0.0 5 / 12
1.8.0 4 / 27
1.7.0 4 / 27
1.6.8 4 / 27
1.6.7 4 / 27
1.6.6 3 / 27
1.6.5 3 / 27

v2.0.13

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: sanity-svc.npm → GitHub Actions (on unknown date, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (sanity-svc.npm) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v2.0.12

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: sanity-svc.npm → GitHub Actions (on unknown date, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (sanity-svc.npm) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v2.0.11

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: sanity-svc.npm → GitHub Actions (on unknown date, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (sanity-svc.npm) on unknown date, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v2.0.10

1 finding
HIGH Provenance attestation missing — previous versions had it provenance

This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.

v2.0.8

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.0.7

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.0.6

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.0.5

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.0.4

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: sanity-svc.npm.

v1.6.7

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.6

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.6.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.