serde-fns
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Husky git-hooks guard; only executes in dev environments with a .git directory, not in consumer installs. | ai |
v1.3.1
2 findingsScript: [ -d .git ] && npm run prepare:husky || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
2 findingsScript: [ -d .git ] && npm run prepare:husky || exit 0
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.