sharedb
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:ot-json0-v2 | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned dep is in devDependencies only; not shipped to consumers, no runtime risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.2 | 5 / 12 |
v5.2.2
2 findingsDependency 'ot-json0-v2' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/ottypes/json0.git#90a3ae26364c4fa3b19b6df34dad46707a704421' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.