shift-parser
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:test262 | AI (npm-metadata): Well-known tc39/test262 test suite pinned in devDependencies; standard practice, not exploit code. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.0.0 | 4 / 21 |
v8.0.0
2 findingsDependency 'test262' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tc39/test262.git#8ed9947df1c4ea34fa1810067529df0806cc07ad' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.