smithers-orchestrator
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:commander | AI (phantom-deps): Used in bundled CLI bin, not directly imported from src. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/bin/cli.js | AI (source-diff): Bun bundler output banner, not true obfuscation; matches documented build:bin script. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@electric-sql/pglite | AI (phantom-deps): Likely loaded dynamically/via config for DB feature. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:opencode-ai | AI (phantom-deps): Used via CLI/config integration, not direct import. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): tree-sitter wasm parsers are standard deps for a code-aware CLI tool. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:babel-preset-solid | AI (phantom-deps): Babel preset referenced in config, not directly imported — standard Babel pattern. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Runs local postinstall.cjs (not a remote fetch); consistent with setup tasks for a CLI/AI orchestration tool. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zustand | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Emscripten-generated WASM loader pattern in bundled cli.js; not a payload decoder. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): eval used to construct ASM_CONSTS in Emscripten asm.js runtime; standard codegen pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): spawnSync in Emscripten shell-exec wrapper; expected for WASM CLI tooling. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Subprocess env pass-through is intentional for Claude CLI executor; not exfiltration. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files; convention-loaded, not directly imported. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/preset-typescript | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped build tooling; not directly imported by convention. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/core | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped build tooling; not directly imported by convention. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-bulk-read | AI (semgrep): Same executor context; filtering ANTHROPIC_API_KEY shows deliberate, safe handling. | ai |
Versions (showing 31 of 31)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.18.0 | 31 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 13 / 6 | |
| 0.2.10 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.9 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.8 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.7 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.6 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.5 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.4 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.3 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.2 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.1 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.1.18 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.1.17 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.1.16 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.1.15 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.1.14 | 10 / 2 | |
| 0.1.13 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.1.12 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.1.11 | 6 / 2 | |
| 0.1.9 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.8 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.7 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.6 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.5 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.4 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.3 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.2 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.1 | 7 / 6 | |
| 0.1.0 | 7 / 6 |
v0.3.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/bin/tree-sitter-javascript-nd0q4pe9.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown_inline-j5349f42.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown-411r6y9b.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-typescript-zxjzwt75.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-zig-e78zbjpm.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.10
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/bin/tree-sitter-javascript-nd0q4pe9.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown_inline-j5349f42.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown-411r6y9b.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-typescript-zxjzwt75.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-zig-e78zbjpm.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.9
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/bin/tree-sitter-javascript-nd0q4pe9.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown_inline-j5349f42.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown-411r6y9b.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-typescript-zxjzwt75.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-zig-e78zbjpm.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.8
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/bin/tree-sitter-javascript-nd0q4pe9.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown_inline-j5349f42.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown-411r6y9b.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-typescript-zxjzwt75.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-zig-e78zbjpm.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.7
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/bin/tree-sitter-javascript-nd0q4pe9.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown_inline-j5349f42.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown-411r6y9b.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-typescript-zxjzwt75.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-zig-e78zbjpm.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/bin/tree-sitter-javascript-nd0q4pe9.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown_inline-j5349f42.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown-411r6y9b.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-typescript-zxjzwt75.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-zig-e78zbjpm.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/bin/tree-sitter-javascript-nd0q4pe9.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown_inline-j5349f42.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown-411r6y9b.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-typescript-zxjzwt75.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-zig-e78zbjpm.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/bin/tree-sitter-javascript-nd0q4pe9.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown_inline-j5349f42.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-markdown-411r6y9b.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-typescript-zxjzwt75.wasm • dist/bin/tree-sitter-zig-e78zbjpm.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.