starpc
Streaming protobuf RPC service protocol over any two-way channel.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): postinstall runs 'go mod vendor' — safe Go dependency vendoring, stable for this hybrid Go/TS package. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently published via CI with SLSA attestation; GitHub Actions publisher is expected. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from paralin to GitHub Actions CI is consistent with SLSA-attested automated publishing pipeline. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): 191-day gap explained by CI/CD pipeline migration; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate publish. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aptre/yamux | AI (dependencies): Same org as starpc (Aperture Robotics); internal dep swap, stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aptre/it-ws | AI (dependencies): First-party dependency from the same Aperture Robotics org as starpc itself. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@aptre/protobuf-es-lite | AI (dependencies): First-party dependency from the same Aperture Robotics org as starpc itself. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ws | AI (phantom-deps): ws is a declared runtime dep used indirectly via isomorphic-ws; phantom-dep false positive stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 42 of 42)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.49.17 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.16 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.15 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.14 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.13 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.11 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.10 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.9 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.8 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.7 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.6 | 11 / 18 | |
| 0.49.4 | 12 / 18 | |
| 0.49.3 | 12 / 18 | |
| 0.49.2 | 12 / 18 | |
| 0.49.1 | 12 / 18 | |
| 0.49.0 | 12 / 18 | |
| 0.48.0 | 12 / 18 | |
| 0.47.1 | 12 / 18 | |
| 0.47.0 | 12 / 18 | |
| 0.46.2 | 12 / 15 | |
| 0.46.1 | 12 / 15 | |
| 0.46.0 | 12 / 15 | |
| 0.45.0 | 12 / 15 | |
| 0.44.0 | 12 / 15 | |
| 0.43.1 | 12 / 15 | |
| 0.42.0 | 12 / 15 | |
| 0.41.2 | 12 / 14 | |
| 0.41.1 | 12 / 14 | |
| 0.41.0 | 12 / 14 | |
| 0.40.1 | 14 / 13 | |
| 0.40.0 | 14 / 13 | |
| 0.39.10 | 12 / 13 | |
| 0.39.9 | 12 / 13 | |
| 0.39.8 | 12 / 13 | |
| 0.39.7 | 12 / 13 | |
| 0.39.6 | 12 / 13 | |
| 0.39.5 | 12 / 13 | |
| 0.39.4 | 12 / 13 | |
| 0.39.3 | 12 / 13 | |
| 0.39.2 | 13 / 13 | |
| 0.39.1 | 13 / 13 | |
| 0.39.0 | 13 / 13 |
v0.49.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.48.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.0
3 findingsScript: go mod vendor
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.46.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.46.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.46.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.45.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.44.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.43.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.42.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.41.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.40.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.40.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.39.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.39.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.39.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.39.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.