stentor-media
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo component package; missing repo/keywords/readme details are stable false positives for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 190)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.74.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.73.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.72.4 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.72.3 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.72.1 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.72.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.71.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.69.19 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.69.14 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.69.9 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.69.7 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.69.6 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.69.5 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.69.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.68.29 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.68.23 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.68.6 | 2 / 10 | |
| 1.68.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.67.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.50 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.49 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.46 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.41 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.37 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.35 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.33 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.30 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.25 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.24 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.22 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.14 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.12 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.10 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.7 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.2 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.66.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.65.11 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.65.9 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.65.7 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.65.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.64.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.16 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.15 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.14 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.13 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.12 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.11 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.10 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.9 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.8 | 3 / 10 | |
| 1.61.7 | 3 / 10 |
v1.74.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (michaelmyers) on 2026-07-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.73.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.