string-match-left-right
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Codsen monorepo migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance; consistent across versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:codsen-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Codsen monorepo pattern; deps used in bundled dist, not directly imported in source. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:arrayiffy-if-string | AI (phantom-deps): Same codsen monorepo bundling pattern; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:string-character-is-astral-surrogate | AI (phantom-deps): Same codsen monorepo bundling pattern; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.1.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 9.1.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 9.0.34 | 3 / 0 | |
| 9.0.33 | 3 / 0 | |
| 9.0.32 | 3 / 0 | |
| 9.0.23 | 3 / 0 |
v9.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.34
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.33
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.32
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.