sushi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Fires in a local ABI file loader iterating known filenames; not user-controlled input. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-tlds | AI (semgrep): URLs are legitimate blockchain RPC endpoints in chain config data, not C2/exfiltration. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.6.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 6.6.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 6.6.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 6.5.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 6.5.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 6.5.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 6.5.0 | 3 / 0 |
v6.6.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.5.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.