tailwind-variants
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Expected artifact of CI/CD publish transition, not a compromise indicator. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Established package resuming activity with improved CI provenance, not takeover pattern. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Build tooling/type additions explain size growth; no injected payload evidence. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 3.2.2 | 0 / 37 | |
| 3.2.1 | 0 / 37 | |
| 3.2.0 | 0 / 37 | |
| 3.1.1 | 0 / 37 | |
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 37 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 37 |
v3.3.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (juniorgarciadev) on 2026-07-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.