tencentcloud-sdk-nodejs-common
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Tencent Cloud SDK legitimately publishes 250+ templated packages; mass-production and link-dump README are expected patterns for this vendor. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.220 | 9 / 19 | |
| 4.1.219 | 9 / 19 | |
| 4.1.122 | 9 / 19 | |
| 4.1.121 | 9 / 19 | |
| 4.1.66 | 8 / 18 | |
| 4.1.65 | 8 / 18 |
v4.1.220
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.219
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.122
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.121
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.66
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.65
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.