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tokenjuice

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Lean output compaction for terminal-heavy agent workflows.

20
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

vincentkoc

Keywords

cliterminalllmtokenscontextdeveloper-tools

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; repo ownership unchanged. ai
npm-metadata suspicious-initial-version AI (npm-metadata): Intentional name-reservation placeholder; 0.0.0 is expected for this package. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Deliberate name-squatting placeholder; tiny/empty payload is by design. ai

Versions (showing 20 of 20)

Version Deps Published
0.8.0 0 / 7
0.7.1 0 / 7
0.7.0 0 / 7
0.6.6 0 / 7
0.6.5 0 / 7
0.6.4 0 / 7
0.6.3 0 / 7
0.6.2 0 / 7
0.6.1 0 / 4
0.6.0 0 / 4
0.5.1 0 / 4
0.5.0 0 / 4
0.4.0 0 / 4
0.3.5 0 / 3
0.3.4 0 / 3
0.3.3 0 / 3
0.3.2 0 / 3
0.3.1 0 / 3
0.3.0 0 / 3
0.0.0 0 / 0

v0.8.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-27) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.5.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.4.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: vincentkoc → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.