tree-sitter-elixir
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:install | AI (install-scripts): node-gyp-build is the standard install pattern for native addons shipping prebuilts; stable and expected for this tree-sitter grammar binding. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Prebuilt .node binaries for 6 platforms are the expected output of prebuildify for a tree-sitter native addon; consistent with the package's documented build flow. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.5 | 2 / 4 |
v0.3.5
3 findingsScript: node-gyp-build
Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • prebuilds/darwin-arm64/tree-sitter-elixir.node • prebuilds/darwin-x64/tree-sitter-elixir.node • prebuilds/linux-arm64/tree-sitter-elixir.node • prebuilds/linux-x64/tree-sitter-elixir.node • prebuilds/win32-arm64/tree-sitter-elixir.node • prebuilds/win32-x64/tree-sitter-elixir.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.