ts-collect
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): postinstall installs git-hooks dev tooling matching package.json config, not arbitrary/fetched code. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Small utility lib with sparse releases; provenance-attested CI publish, not a takeover pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 8 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 8 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 8 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 8 |
v0.4.2
3 findingsScript: bunx git-hooks
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-07-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.