tzdata
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/rogierschouten | AI (email-domain): The 'email' field contains a GitHub profile URL, not an actual email address. The analyzer misinterprets the URL as an email domain. No real domain hijacking risk exists; the GitHub URL matches the repo owner. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.49 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.48 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.47 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.46 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.45 | 0 / 0 |
v1.0.49
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/rogierschouten' uses domain 'https://github.com/rogierschouten' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.48
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.47
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.46
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.45
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.