unloader
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Change reflects CI/CD attestation adoption, not compromise; SLSA provenance present. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Normal gap for a maintained but low-cadence utility package by a known author. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.0 | 4 / 14 | |
| 0.8.3 | 6 / 15 | |
| 0.8.2 | 6 / 15 | |
| 0.8.1 | 6 / 15 | |
| 0.8.0 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.7.1 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.7.0 | 6 / 15 | |
| 0.6.1 | 6 / 15 | |
| 0.6.0 | 5 / 13 | |
| 0.5.0 | 5 / 13 |
v0.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.