unplugin-isolated-decl
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): CI/CD bot publish with SLSA attestation; improvement not compromise. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Small utility dep swap (debug->obug) by same maintainer, not unvetted third-party. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.16.0 | 6 / 23 | |
| 0.15.7 | 6 / 23 | |
| 0.15.6 | 6 / 22 | |
| 0.15.5 | 6 / 23 | |
| 0.15.4 | 6 / 23 | |
| 0.15.3 | 6 / 24 | |
| 0.15.2 | 6 / 24 | |
| 0.15.1 | 6 / 24 | |
| 0.15.0 | 6 / 24 | |
| 0.14.7 | 6 / 24 | |
| 0.14.6 | 6 / 24 |
v0.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.