unrouting
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): gitHead absence explained by CI/CD publish with SLSA attestation; not a risk for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): Trusted high-volume publisher; 0.0.0 reflects early package stage, not malware. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Minor metadata omission, not a risk signal for this established publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.2 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 13 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.