use-fireproof
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): New files are the result of a monorepo split into @fireproof/* sub-packages; expected for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase reflects bundling of split sub-package sources, not injected payload. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep @fireproof/use-fireproof is the same org's monorepo split; not a third-party injection. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Published via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; automated publishing is expected for this org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@fireproof/core-types-blockstore | AI (phantom-deps): Type-level dep referenced in config/types; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@fireproof/vendor | AI (phantom-deps): Transitive/config-level dep from the same org; stable false positive. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@fireproof/use-fireproof | AI (dependencies): This package is explicitly a re-export wrapper for its scoped sibling; the dependency is intentional and stable across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 28 of 28)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.24.19 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.16 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.15 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.14 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.13 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.12 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.24.0 | 14 / 0 | |
| 0.23.15 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.23.14 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.23.13 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.11 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.10 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.8 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.7 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.6 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.5 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.3 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.2 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.1 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.23.0 | 12 / 8 | |
| 0.20.5 | 1 / 0 |
v0.24.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.