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very-happy-dom

Like a light-weight version of `happy-dom` powered by Bun.

7
Versions
MIT
License
Yes
Install Scripts
Attested
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation (unverified) npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

chrisbreuer

Keywords

very-happy-domhappy-domdomtestingbunjsdomvirtual-dom

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
source-diff large-new-source-files AI (source-diff): Feature growth in established package, no malicious behavior found. ai
source-diff source-size-tripled AI (source-diff): Legitimate expansion (benchmarks, tooling), not bundled payload. ai
install-script:postinstall sean
publish-pattern rapid-publish AI (publish-pattern): Explained by CI/CD automated release pipeline with provenance. ai

Versions (showing 7 of 7)

Version Deps Published
0.1.9 0 / 6
0.1.6 0 / 6
0.1.4 0 / 6
0.1.2 0 / 4
0.0.9 0 / 1
0.0.8 0 / 1
0.0.7 0 / 1

v0.1.9

3 findings
HIGH Package has 'postinstall' script install-scripts

Script: bunx --bun git-hooks

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: chrisbreuer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-16, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-07-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.1.6

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: chrisbreuer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-16, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-07-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.1.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.2

2 findings
HIGH Package has 'postinstall' script install-scripts

Script: bunx --bun git-hooks

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.