vite-ssg
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): antfu-collective project migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 28.3.0 | 7 / 19 | |
| 28.2.2 | 7 / 19 | |
| 28.2.1 | 7 / 19 | |
| 28.1.0 | 7 / 19 | |
| 28.0.0 | 7 / 19 |
v28.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v28.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.