webpack-bugsnag-plugins
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Bugsnag package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal for this well-known package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@bugsnag/cli | AI (dependencies): @bugsnag/cli is the official first-party Bugsnag CLI; its use here is expected and legitimate for a Bugsnag webpack plugin. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.2.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.2.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 6 |
v2.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.